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Abstract A radiation protection philosophy for exposure situations following
an accident has been developed by international organisations such as the ICRP,
IAEA, NEA/OECD, FAO/WHO, and the CEC during the last decade. After the
Chernobyl accident, the application of radiation protection principles for interven-
tion situations such as exposure from accidental contamination or radon in dwellings
were further developed and this work is still in progress. The present intervention
policy recommended by the international organisations as well as by the Nordic radi-
ation protection authorities is reviewed. The Nordic Intervention levels for foodstuﬀ
restrictions, both for the Chernobyl and post-Chernobyl periods, have been based
on dose limits and they are therefore in conﬂict with international intervention
policy. Illustrative examples on intervention level setting for relocation and food-
stuﬀ restrictions are derived for Nordic conditions from the optimisation principle
recommended by the international organisations. Optimised Generic Intervention
Levels have been determined to be about 10 mSv·month−1 for relocation/return
and 5,000−30,000 Bq·kg−1 for restrictions on various foodstuﬀs contaminated with
137Cs and 131I.
This work has been performed as a part of the Nordic Safety Research Programme
(NKS) under the Section “Emergency in abnormal radiation situations” (BER).
The purpose of the BER-programme is to evaluate systematically those parts of
emergency preparedness that need to be harmonized within the Nordic Countries
as a basis for uniform action in emergency situations.
The present report of the NKS-programme BER-3 has been prepared within Risø-
project No. 02471-00. The aim of the BER-3 project is to propose and harmonize
Nordic Intervention Levels for protective actions in case of a nuclear accident. A part
of the project is to review the work of the international organisations on intervention.
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1 Introduction
After the Chernobyl accident a new thinking in radiation protection principles
evolved. The radiation protection philosophy of today as recommended by the ICRP
distinguishes between (a) the introduction of a practice which causes either actual
exposures or probabilities of exposure and therefore will add radiation doses to the
existing background, and (b) intervention situations in which radiation exposures
can be reduced only by intervention in order to put exposed people in a better
position.
In intervention situations such as the post-Chernobyl situation or radon in
dwellings, the radiation sources, pathways, and exposed individuals are already
present when the decisions on control measures are being considered. The reduction
of radiation doses can therefore be achieved only by intervention. The protective
measures forming a programme of intervention, which always have some disadvan-
tages, should each be justiﬁed on its own merit in the sense that it should do more
good than harm, and its form, scale, and duration should be optimised so as to
maximise the net beneﬁt.
The dose limits are intended for use in the control of practices and not for
intervention. The use of these dose limits, or of any other pre-determined dose
limits, as the basis for deciding on intervention might involve measures that would
be out of all proportion to the beneﬁt obtained and would be in conﬂict with the
principle of justiﬁcation. Therefore, dose limits must not be used for deciding on the
need for or scope of intervention. However, at some level of individual dose, which
would cause serious deterministic eﬀects, some kind of intervention will become
almost always justiﬁed.
After the Chernobyl accident the international radiation protection organisations
have been engaged in the work of improving the criteria for intervention. The ICRP,
IAEA, and NEA/OECD have all been involved in the general philosophy, whereas
other organisations only have been working on guidance on foodstuﬀ control.
In order to provide background for the Nordic interpretation of international
recommendations of radiation protection philosophy for interventions, the present
report reviews the recommendations developed by the ICRP, IAEA, NEA/OECD,
WHO/FAO, and CEC for protection of the public. The present situation in the
Nordic countries is also reviewed. Illustrative examples on the derivation of Inter-
vention Levels from the justiﬁcation/optimisation principles are elaborated.
The work has been performed as a part of the Nordic BER-3 Project Evaluation
and harmonization of countermeasures and the use of intervention levels.
2 International Guidance on Intervention
at the time of the Chernobyl Accident
General
The Commission of the European Communities (CEC) was the ﬁrst international
body to publish guidance in 1982 to its member states on reference levels of radiation
dose as guidance to national authorities in setting intervention levels [11]. Similar
guidance was published by the ICRP in 1984 [2], World Health Organization, WHO,
in 1984 [8] and International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, in 1985 [1].
The guidance given by these four organizations was similar in essence. The WHO
guidance was less quantitative; the reference dose levels for sheltering, distribution
of stable iodine tablets, and evacuation set forth by CEC diﬀer slightly from those
given by ICRP and IAEA; and the CEC did not give any values for control of
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foodstuﬀs. The ICRP and IAEA gave almost identical advice.
The basic principles given by ICRP [2] for planning intervention for accident
situations and setting intervention levels were the following:
(a) Serious deterministic eﬀects should be avoided by the introduction of coun-
termeasures to limit individual dose to levels below the thresholds for these
eﬀects;
(b) The risk from stochastic eﬀects should be limited by introducing countermea-
sures which achieve a positive net beneﬁt to the individuals involved;
(c) The overall incidence of stochastic eﬀects should be limited, as far as reasonably
practicable, by reducing the collective dose equivalent.
It was internationally recognized that the spectrum of accident situations is wide,
and that diﬃculties in implementing protective measures after an accident vary
widely from country to country and even from place to place within a country.
Therefore, it was not considered possible to set one generally applicable intervention
level at which a particular action would always be required.
On the other hand, it was recognized that introduction of protective measures
would be almost certain if the projected radiation dose were such that serious de-
terministic eﬀects or a high probability of stochastic eﬀects would be expected. It
was also considered that it would be possible, on radiation protection grounds, to
deﬁne a level of radiation dose for each countermeasure below which introduction
of the countermeasure would not likely be warranted.
Upper dose levels above which introduction of the countermeasure is almost cer-
tain and lower dose levels, below which introduction of the countermeasure is not
warranted were given for whole body irradiation and also for individual organs. Be-
tween the recommended upper and lower levels site-speciﬁc intervention levels were
expected to be set by national authorities. The intervention levels covered both
early and intermediate phases. For the late phase no values were recommended,
since it was considered that the main questions facing the decision maker would be
whether and when normal living could be resumed, and the situations would vary
too widely to give any generic numbers for that purpose.
The numerical values of the intervention levels recommended by the IAEA [1]
and ICRP [2] for the ﬁrst year after the accident are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. ICRP intervention level ranges for introducing countermeasures
Countermeasure Dose levels
Whole body Single organs
Sheltering 5 – 50 mSv 50 – 500 mSv
Stable iodine – 50 – 500 mSv
Evacuation 50 – 500 mSv 500 – 5000 mSv
Relocation 50 – 500 mSv/a not anticipated
Control of foodstuﬀs 5 – 50 mSv/a 50 – 500 mSv/a
The projected dose per year for relocation and foodstuﬀ control are deﬁned only
for the ﬁrst year.
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Main problems in the earlier recommendations
In regard to international guidance on intervention levels a number of problems
were identiﬁed when it was applied to the Chernobyl accident, although its basic
principles were still considered to be valid. The major diﬃculties in its application
were:
• how to apply intervention levels. For example, in the case of food, did the inter-
vention level refer to the sum of the food items or to each of them separately?
• how to compare the dose with the intervention level. Was the projected dose
or the avertable dose relevant?
• how was the principle (c) to be applied? What was the relationship between
principles (b) and (c)?
Major confusion was also created by the references in the ICRP publication [2] to
the dose limits in justifying the numerical values of the intervention levels.
3 The International Commission on Ra-
diological Protection
3.1 ICRP Publication 60
In the new general radiation protection recommendations from the ICRP [6], a
generalized description is given of the system of radiation protection in existing
exposure situations such as radon in dwellings and (post) accident/emergency sit-
uations.
Basic Principles
In existing exposure situations, i.e. existing at the time when control procedures
are being considered, the choice of action is limited. The most eﬀective action, that
applied at the source, is rarely available and controls have to be applied in the form
of intervention.
The system of radiological protection for intervention is based on the following
general principles:
(a) The proposed intervention should do more good than harm, i.e. the reduction
in detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be suﬃcient to justify
the harm and the costs, including social costs, of the intervention.
(b) The form, scale, and duration of the intervention should be optimised so that
the net beneﬁt of the reduction of dose, i.e. the beneﬁt of the reduction in
radiation detriment, less the detriment associated with the intervention, should
be maximised.
Dose limits do not apply in the case of intervention. Principles (a) and (b) can lead to
intervention levels which provide guidance to those situations in which intervention
is appropriate. Because of serious deterministic eﬀects, there will be some level
of projected dose above which intervention will almost always be justiﬁed. The
process of justiﬁcation and optimisation both apply to the protective action, so it
is necessary to consider them together when reaching a decision.
Justiﬁcation is the process of deciding that the disadvantages of each compo-
nent of intervention, i.e. of each protective action or, in the case of accidents, each
countermeasure, are more than oﬀset by the reductions in the dose likely to be
achieved. Optimization is the process of deciding on the method, scale, and du-
ration of the action so as to obtain the maximum net beneﬁt. In simple terms,
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the diﬀerence between the disadvantages and the beneﬁts, expressed in the same
terms, e.g. monetary terms, should be positive for each countermeasure adopted
and should be maximized by setting the details of that countermeasure.
The cost of intervention is not expressed solely in terms of monetary cost. Some
remedial actions may involve non-radiological risks or serious social impacts. For
example, the short-term removal of people from their homes is not very expensive,
but it may cause the temporary separation of members of a family and result in
considerable anxiety. Prolonged evacuation and permanent relocation are both ex-
pensive and traumatic.
Application of principles
Because the initial introduction of protective actions on any scale, however small,
involves signiﬁcant costs, it may well be that small-scale, short duration intervention
is costly without being eﬀective. As the proposed scale and duration are increased,
the eﬀectiveness initially increases without a marked increase in costs, so the net
beneﬁt may become positive. Eventually, further increases will fail to achieve in-
creased beneﬁts comparable with their costs, and the net beneﬁt again becomes
negative. There is then a range of values of the possible intervention level of in-
dividual dose averted, within which there is an optimum level. If the net beneﬁt
at that optimum is positive, intervention of the deﬁned type, scale, and duration
will be justiﬁed.
The beneﬁt of a particular countermeasure within a programme of intervention
should be judged on the basis of the reduction in dose achieved or expected by that
special protective action, the dose averted. Thus, each protective action has to be
considered on its own merits. For example, decisions about the control of individual
foodstuﬀs are independent of those made about other foodstuﬀs, and about shelter-
ing and evacuation. In addition, however, the doses that would be incurred via all
the relevant pathway of exposure, some subject to protective actions and some not,
should be assessed. If the total dose to some individuals is so high as to be unaccept-
able in any circumstances, the feasibility of additional countermeasures inﬂuencing
the major contributions to the total dose should be urgently reviewed. Doses caus-
ing serious deterministic eﬀects or a very high probability of stochastic eﬀects
would call for such a review.
3.2 ICRP Publication 40 Revision 1
The revision of the Publication 40 was adopted by the Commission in November
1992 [3]. The following aspects are stressed when applying the basic principles of
intervention introduced in Publication 60.
The ﬁrst concern in the event of a radiological emergency is to keep the expo-
sure to individuals from all pathways below the thresholds for serious deterministic
health eﬀects. In addition to preventing serious deterministic eﬀects, the unaccept-
ability of a high risk of stochastic health eﬀects to individuals may be a signiﬁcant
factor in the decision making process. In this case, the justiﬁcation of the protec-
tive action from the individual’s point of view may become the dominant factor. In
fact, when deciding on the implementation of protective actions, the decision maker
should ﬁrst determine whether the protective action is justiﬁed from the viewpoint
of those individuals who are at most risk.
After that, consideration should be given to justifying the action from the view-
point of society, since the costs and beneﬁts will probably not be evenly distributed
amongst the same people. The societal considerations may extend the protective
action to cover an even larger group of aﬀected people, or they may set limits to
the practical or ﬁnancial feasibility of the action (e.g. evacuation of a large city). In
case the proposed protective action is not justiﬁed from the viewpoint of the indi-
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viduals, decision makers may still seek to reduce the collective dose and hence the
detriment from the emergency, and care should be taken not to do more harm than
good.
Justiﬁcation of an intervention should begin by considering the average avertable
individual dose for the whole of the exposed population to which the interven-
tion would be applied (e.g. sheltering, evacuation, relocation). In some cases the
avertable collective dose can be used when the exposed population is not easily
identiﬁed (e.g. food restrictions, decontamination). If implementation of the protec-
tive action is not justiﬁed, consideration should be given as to whether there are
subgroups of the population whose characteristics diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the av-
erage and for whom the protective action might be justiﬁed (e.g. by greater doses
to be averted or lesser costs). These include pregnant women and small children,
hospitalized or other institutionalized individuals. Separate optimisation is needed
for workers engaged in the protective measures and social and psychological costs
should be considered when diﬀerent population groups are treated diﬀerently.
Political and wider social factors will necessarily be a part of decision mak-
ing following radiological emergencies. The competent authorities responsible for
radiation protection should therefore be prepared to provide the radiation protec-
tion input (justiﬁcation and optimisation of the protective actions on radiological
grounds) to the decision making process in a systematic manner, indicating all the
radiological factors already considered in the analysis of the protection strategy.
In the decision process the radiological protection and the political factors should
each be taken into account only once to avoid the introduction of the same politi-
cal factors in several places.
Table 2. Summary of Recommended Intervention Levels (ILs) from the ICRP.
Intervention Levels of averted dose or averted activity concentration
Protective measure Almost always justiﬁed Range of optimum values
Sheltering (< 1 day) 50 (a) 5 − 50 (a)
Administration of 500 (b) 50 − 500 (b)
stable iodine
Evacuation (< 1 week) 500 (a) 50 − 500 (a)
5,000 (c) 500 − 5,000 (c)
Restriction on a 10 mSv in a year (d) 1,000 − 10,000 Bq·kg−1
single foodstuﬀ (β-emitters)
10 − 100 Bq·kg−1
(α-emitters)
Relocation 1,000 (a) 5 − 25 mSv per month (a)
(a) is averted eﬀective dose
(b) is averted equivalent dose to thyroid
(c) is averted equivalent dose to skin
(d) is averted eﬀective dose committed in a year
It is of great importance, however, that decision makers inform the public of all
aspects of their decisions, especially when the interventions are chosen mainly for
political, social, and/or economic reasons, rather than on health protection grounds.
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Otherwise the public may be misled and the radiological protection eﬀorts will be
mistrusted.
The recommended Intervention Levels from the ICRP in Publication 40, Revision
1 are summarised in Table 2 [3].
4 The International Atomic Energy
Agency
4.1 IAEA Safety Series No. 72 Revision 1
The IAEA has prepared a revised Safety Guide, “Radiological Protection Principles
for Sources not under Control: Their Application to Accidents” [4], which is intended
to supersede the Safety Series No. 72. It explains in more detail the situations in
which some aspects of the normal system of radiological protection do not apply
in accident situations, and describes the principles to be used in these situations.
This guide, however, is not intended to provide a selection of numbers that can
be conveniently adopted by responsible authorities for their emergency plans but
rather to encourage the authorities to generate their emergency plans with the basic
principles as their foundation.
In order to apply the system of radiological protection to existing sources the
basic principles were restated concerning the interventions aﬀecting the members
of the public, as follows [4]:
(1) The intervention should be justiﬁed in the sense that introduction of the
protective measure should achieve more good than harm.
(2) The level at which the intervention is introduced, and the level at which it is
later withdrawn, should be optimised so that it will produce the maximum
net beneﬁt.
(3) All possible eﬀorts should be made to prevent serious deterministic health
eﬀects by restricting doses to individuals to levels below the threshold for such
eﬀects.
The ﬁrst two principles each require, according to the IAEA, consideration of the
beneﬁt that would be achieved by the intervention and the harm, in its broadest
sense, that would also result from it. They therefore require the use of the procedures
for reaching decisions. The inputs to justiﬁcation and optimisation studies include
factors that are related to radiological protection, whereas the ﬁnal decisions may
also depend on other factors, probably of a political nature. Radiological factors are
deﬁned as those which are related to the level of protection achieved. Thus they
include factors describing the doses averted and those describing the costs and
other disadvantages incurred in averting the doses.
IAEA has considered the following factors to be clearly radiological protection
factors which are more or less quantiﬁable:
• the avertable individual and collective risks from exposure to radiation for the
members of the public
• the individual and collective physical risks to the public caused by the coun-
termeasure
• the individual and collective risks to the workers in carrying out the counter-
measure
• the monetary cost of the countermeasure
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• reassurance of the public and the workers provided by the implementation of
the countermeasure
• anxiety caused by the implementation of the countermeasure
• individual and social disruption caused by the implementation of the counter-
measure
Although the two principles of justiﬁcation and optimisation are stated separately
and are indeed conceptually separate, it is necessary to consider them together
when reaching a decision. The general case is likely to be that there is a range of
optimised values of the intervention level for diﬀerent scenarios that give more good
than harm, so that the intervention is then justiﬁed over this range of levels, with the
selection of the most appropriate level depending on the particular circumstances.
The characteristics of accident sequences postulated for a nuclear installation,
the local environmental conditions and national or regional considerations may all
inﬂuence the choice of intervention levels. Clearly, to be most appropriate, interven-
tion levels should be developed speciﬁcally for the circumstances of interest. This
need for speciﬁcity and the potential variability of intervention levels depending on
the prevailing circumstances inhibit the degree to which quantitative guidance can
be established that will be broadly (internationally) applicable.
However, IAEA has provided indicative guidance that may be used as an aid
to national authorities in establishing their own particular levels. Such guidance is
given in Table 3 for the ﬁve major protective measures: sheltering, issue of stable
iodine, evacuation, relocation, and food restrictions. For each protective measure
an intervention level range is given. The indicative nature of the guidance must be
emphasized and it must not be taken to preclude intervention levels outside the
speciﬁed ranges. It would, however, be erroneous to select arbitrarily values from
the bottom of the range in preference to others on the grounds that this is cau-
tious and would therefore lead to the best outcome.
Table 3. IAEA indicative guidance on Intervention Levels (a).
Protective Quantity (b) Whole body Thyroid
Measure eﬀective dose dose dose
Sheltering External plus committed About a few to a
doses from intakes (mSv) few tens of mSv
Administration Committed doses from - About a few
of stable iodine intakes (mSv) tens to a few
hundred mSv
Evacuation External plus committed About ten to a few
doses from intakes (mSv) hundred mSv
Relocation (c) External plus committed doses About a few to a
from intake over a year (mSv) hundred mSv (d)
Food control (e) Committed doses from intakes About one to a
in a year (mSv) few tens of mSv
(a) This quantitative guidance is indicative only. The ranges of values should not be
adopted for application without ﬁrst analysing carefully their appropriateness
to the particular circumstances of interest.
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(b) This is the quantity to be compared with the intervention level. In principle
it is the dose averted that is to be compared but in practice this can often be
equated with the projected dose.
(c) A somewhat wider range of levels is quoted for relocation compared with the
other protective measures. This is intended to reﬂect the greater sensitivity of
this measure to the magnitude of the accident.
(d) In some cases, this criterion can also be expressed in terms of dose rate. In
these circumstances the indicative guidance for dose rate is in the range of one
to a few tens of μSv/h.
(e) This applies separately to each of the following categories of foodstuﬀs: dairy
products, meats, vegetables, grain, fruit, drinking water and beverages.
It should be emphasized that the ranges given in Table 3 should not be considered
as the two–tier system recommended earlier by practically all the international
organisations. The ranges should, on the other hand, be considered as comprising
the optimum intervention levels that would be achievable in practice depending on
the accidental and site speciﬁc circumstances.
Intervention levels are speciﬁed in terms of averted dose. In practice, however,
the results of environmental measurements will be expressed in terms of dose rates
and concentrations (e.g. mSv/h, Bq/m3, Bq/m2). In order to interpret these mea-
surements in terms of intervention levels of dose, it is convenient to calculate in
advance operational intervention levels (OILs) which correspond, under speci-
ﬁed conditions, to intervention levels. These operational intervention levels are ex-
pressed in the same quantities and units as the environmental measurements. The
principles and procedures for deriving numerical values of the OILs have been pub-
lished by the IAEA as part of its programme of Safety Series publications in the
Safety Series No. 81, “Derived Intervention Levels for Application in Controlling
Radiation Doses to the Public in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency” [5] which is presently under revision.
In practice, intervention levels can in many cases be derived in easily measurable
quantities directly as a result of the optimisation process (see Annex B and C).
4.2 IAEA Safety Series No. 81 Revision 1
At present, a revision of Safety Series No. 81 [5] is undertaken by the IAEA. The
major change will be that the revised document will be a general document on
intervention levels and not speciﬁcally on derived intervention levels. The rec-
ommended intervention levels would be based on the justiﬁcation/optimisation
principles. ILs will be given for both urgent and later countermeasures. Publica-
tion of the revised report in the Safety Series is planned for in 1993.
Table 4. IAEA Intervention Levels (ILs) for control of foodstuﬀs (Bq/kg).
Radionuclide Fresh milk, Vegetables, Meat, Milk Products
Grain, Fruit
106Ru, 131I, 134Cs, 137Cs 3,000 30,000
90Sr 300 3,000
238Pu, 239Pu, 241Am 30 300
12 Risø–R–652(EN)
Intervention levels are given for the protective measures of sheltering, administration
of stable iodine, evacuation, control of foodstuﬀs, and relocation. Preliminary values
of ILs for foodstuﬀ control are shown in Table 4.
For relocation, a distinction is made between temporary and permanent relo-
cation. Temporary relocation is the removal of people for an extended but limited
period of time, and permanent relocation is a removal of people with no expecta-
tion of return within their lifetime. Preliminary values of ILs for temporary and
permanent relocation as well as for sheltering, evacuation, and thyroid blocking
are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. IAEA Intervention Levels (ILs) for sheltering, evacuation, thyroid blocking
and relocation.
Protective measure Intervention Level
Sheltering 3 mSv/6 h
Evacuation 10 mSv/day
Stable iodine 50 mGy (infants)
500 mGy (adults)
Temporary relocation 30 mSv in ﬁrst month
10 mSv/month in
subsequent months
Permanent relocation 1 Sv
5 The Nuclear Energy Agency
In the 1990 the NEA/OECD published a report [7] that outlines the status of rel-
evant international activities on intervention principles, discusses these principles,
and describes the proposed accident management system together with a general
scheme for its application. The principles and criteria for intervention presented
in the report, although developed with speciﬁc reference to reactor accidents, ap-
ply equally well to activities and possible accidents at other nuclear facilities. The
report describes brieﬂy the transition from an “accident management” situation
back to a “normal” situation and the related problem of changing criteria for the
protection of the public.
Basic Principles
The basic principles of the system for accident management as prescribed by the
NEA are given below:
(a) any intervention should be justiﬁed, that is, the introduction of a protective
measure should achieve more good than harm;
(b) the level at which an intervention is introduced, and the level at which it is
later withdrawn, should be optimised so that it will produce the maximum
good;
(c) the doses to individuals should not exceed levels judged as unacceptable.
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These principles are seen as generally applicable to all situations and in all circum-
stances, irrespective of time and distance from the source of the accident.
Application of principles
In the assessment of the radiological impact of an accident from a given exposure
pathway, the dose which results from a calculation is usually the average individ-
ual projected dose committed in the group of people primarily aﬀected by that
pathway (reference group). Therefore, it is appropriate, in practice, to express the
IL as a projected dose (rather than an averted dose) in order to make it possible
to compare the projected doses from calculations directly with the corresponding
intervention level. This can be done by introducing the concept of eﬃciency of a
protective measure.
In the management of accidents, there are two distinct phases in which optimisa-
tion of the protective measures should be considered: In the phase of planning for
countermeasures and in the phase of actually encountering them.
In the planning phase, a generic optimisation of the protective measures should
be studied, based on generic accident scenario calculations. The result of these
studies should result, for each protective measure, in optimised generic ILs to be
used immediately after an accident and for a short time later.
In a real accident situation, a more precise and speciﬁc optimisation process,
based on real data, should be carried out and should result in speciﬁc ILs for
each protective measure to be used in the longer time period after the accident. It
should be emphasized that the search for the best strategy of countermeasures is
primarily applicable to the phase of speciﬁc optimisation.
Individual dose boundaries
If a given group of people were exposed to several independent pathways the total
dose from the diﬀerent pathways might be judged as unacceptable. This may require
the introduction of an Upper Boundary (UB) of the total individual dose which
should not be exceeded, if and as feasible, irrespective of the result of the justiﬁcation
and optimisation procedures. The establishment of values for the UB is a matter of
judgement by national authorities. However, in order to limit the possible diversity
of such values between member countries, it would be appropriate to reach an
international consensus on the establishment of the UB and, possibly, on a uniﬁed
value of an Overall Upper Boundary (OUB). The values suggested are a whole
body dose of 0.5 Gy committed in a short time and an accumulated eﬀective dose
of 0.3−0.5 Sv in the long term.
In some cases, the projected average individual dose from a given pathway is
so low that even the application of the justiﬁcation and optimisation process is
not warranted on pure radiological grounds. It appears, therefore, appropriate to
establish for each exposure pathway a Lower Boundary (LB) below which protec-
tive actions are unlikely to be justiﬁed. To limit unnecessary discrepancies between
member countries, eﬀorts should be made to reach an international consensus on
the establishment of the LB and, possibly, on an uniﬁed value of a Minimum Lower
Boundary (MLB), which is suggested to be in range of 0.1−1 mSv committed in
the ﬁrst year after the accident.
6 World Health Organisation
After the Chernobyl accident it was recognized that the available guidelines on the
management of the consequences of a nuclear accident did not adequately cover the
actions to be taken to protect the population in areas far from the accident site.
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Therefore, WHO has, in close consultation with CEC, IAEA, and OECD/NEA,
developed guidelines [9] to assist national authorities in making decisions on the
control of food in the event of widespread contamination by radionuclides from a
major nuclear accident.
An Intervention Level of individual dose of 5 mSv/a has been recommended as
justiﬁed by comparison with the variation of the natural background radiation that
expose the whole body. The total radiation doses from the background exposure lie
between 1 and 10 mSv/a. An Intervention Level of 5 mSv/a is therefore comparable
with the global variation of the eﬀective dose due to natural radiation sources.
The value of the Derived Intervention Level (DIL) for a category of food varies
inversely with the mass consumed, m, and the committed eﬀective dose per unit
activity intake, e(50), and directly with the Reference Level of Dose (Intervention
Level), RLD:
DIL =
RLD
m · e(50) (1)
The guidelines values for the DILs have been calculated for seven food categories
and for drinking water. The calculated values are based on an eﬀective dose of
5 mSv/a for each nuclide in isolation in a single food category, since it is
not possible to generalise regarding which nuclides will be most important in each
food category after an accident. The calculations have been made for radionuclides
with both a high and low dose per unit intake. These values are shown in Table 6 [9].
Table 6. WHO guideline values for Derived Intervention Levels (Bq/kg).
Nuclides Cereals Roots Vegetables Fruit Meat Milk Fish Water
Low dose 3,500 5,000 8,000 7,000 10,000 4,500 35,000 700
Factor
High dose 35 50 80 70 100 45 350 7
Factor
The DILs shown in Table 6 have been calculated from a normalized hypotheti-
cal diet of a total consumption rate of 550 kg/a based on representative values
of higher-than-average consumptions of diﬀerent food components in diﬀerent
parts of the world. The radionuclides that can be represented by a high dose factor
are 239Pu and other actinides. The radionuclides with a low dose factor are 137Cs,
134Cs, 131I and all other β-/γ-emitting radionuclides of interest.
7 Codex Alimentarius Commission
In the 1989 the Codex Alimentarius Commission published a set of joint FAO/WHO
recommendations [10] to control foods in international trade that have been acci-
dentally contaminated with radionuclides. The goal was to provide a system that
can be uniformly and simply applied by government authorities and yet one that
achieves a level of public health protection to the individual that is more than
adequate in the event of a nuclear accident.
The joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) has based its rec-
ommendations on a reference level of dose of 5 mSv/a and a total average
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consumption rate of food of 550 kg/a all of which is assumed to be contami-
nated. The CAC has adopted guideline values of radionuclide contamination in
food below which the foodstuﬀs are acceptable for international trade without re-
strictions. The CAC values are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. CAC guideline values for radionuclides in food moving in international
trade.
Radionuclides Activity concentration
(Bq/kg)
239Pu and other actinides in milk and infant food 1
239Pu and other actinides in other food 10
90Sr in milk and infant food 100
90Sr in other food 1000
131I, 134Cs, 137Cs and other nuclides 1000
The levels in Table 7 are based on very conservative assumptions and are intended
to be used as values below which no food control restrictions need be applied
in international trade. Measured values above these levels are not necessarily of
public health concern, but should alert the competent food control authorities for
the need to assess the potential health detriment.
The values were developed for ease of application in international trade and
mean that when the guideline levels are exceeded governments should decide
whether and under what circumstances the food should be distributed within their
territory or jurisdiction. The values are not inﬂuenced by optimisation and can be
regarded as being below regulatory concern.
8 Commission of the European Commu-
nities
After the Chernobyl accident the CEC established a set of Derived Reference Levels
(DRLs) for control of foodstuﬀs [12, 13]. At present, the Article 31 Group of Experts
is preparing guidelines for introduction of relocation.
8.1 Derived Reference Levels for Foodstuﬀs
According to the Report by the Article 31 Group of Experts, it is not appropriate to
set ﬁrm limits in dealing with emergency situations because an emergency is rarely,
if ever, susceptible to rigid limitation [12]. It is, however, very useful to establish
Reference Levels below which action is likely to be inappropriate and above
which intervention ought to be either taken, or at least seriously considered. The
Reference Level must be related to the severity and complexity of the intervention
action. Simple actions, with few social consequences, are appropriate at low levels
of radiation exposure. Complex actions, on the other hand, require high levels of
exposure before they can be justiﬁed.
The Group of Experts recommended the adoption of two Reference Levels (RLs) -
a lower RL below which action is extremely unlikely to be justiﬁed on radiological
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protection grounds and an upper RL at which action is almost certain to have
been attempted on radiological protection grounds. Between the two levels there is
scope for judgement.
For the ﬁrst year after an accident, a lower RL of 5 mSv was recommended for the
committed eﬀective dose equivalent to an age of 70 years from the consumption of
foodstuﬀs [12]. The upper RL was recommended to be 50 mSv. For iodine isotopes
the lower and upper RLs were recommended to be 50 mSv and 500 mSv to the
thyroid, respectively. For subsequent years, the RLs should be reduced by a factor
of 5, i.e. to 1 mSv and 10 mSv, respectively. No RLs for the thyroid are needed
in the later years because the relevant iodine isotopes all have short half-lives.
For the long-term control of foodstuﬀs the term Derived Reference Level
(DRL) has been used in the recommendations [12]. It is not a limit and certainly
not a tolerance limit or a tolerance level, nor should it be directly used in regulations.
It is a guide for administrative action for the competent authorities in the process
of optimisation. In principle, each foodstuﬀ should have a diﬀerent DRL for each
nuclide, and a calculation should be carried out on each occasion and for each
location, depending on the activity level in all the relevant foodstuﬀs for all the
relevant nuclides.
As a basis for Community action, the Group of Experts did instead establish
interim proposals for the major components of diet for three classes of ra-
dionuclides, with the conservative assumption that an individual’s intake would
be equivalent to the consumption of 10 % of the relevant dietary component, uni-
formly contaminated to the full value of the DRL, for an entire year. This
factor was included in the computations and provides the conservatism needed
to make it unnecessary to consider the separate foodstuﬀs jointly. They can be
treated independently. Each food group and each group of nuclides can thus be
treated separately from all the others - no allowance need be made for the exis-
tence of several contaminated foodstuﬀs or of nuclides in more than one group. In
Table 8 the recommended DRLs are shown for future accidents [12]. These values
are all based on the lower RL mentioned above.
Table 8. CEC Derived Reference Levels (Bq/kg) (DRL) for the control of foodstuﬀs
following an accident.
Radionuclides Dairy products Major foodstuﬀs Drinking water
1st later 1st later 1st later
year years year years year years
Cesium 20,000 4,000 30,000 5,000 4,000 700
Iodine, strontium 700 500 7,000 3,000 500 400
Plutonium 80 20 400 80 60 10
For minor foodstuﬀs, e.g. those with an annual consumption of less than about 10
kg, values of 10 times those for major foodstuﬀs will be appropriate.
Due to political considerations the Commission did not adopt the proposals
from the Article 31 Group of Experts but reduced the DRLs by a factor 4 or more.
The recommended values from the Commission are shown in Table 9 [13].
If the Commission receives oﬃcial information on a nuclear accident substanti-
ating that the maximum permissible levels in Table 9 are likely to be reached or
have been reached, it will immediately adopt a regulation rendering those maxi-
mum permissible levels. The period of validity of this regulation shall not exceed
three months. After consultation with experts, which shall include the Article
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31 Group of Experts, the Commission shall submit to the Council a proposal for
adoption or conﬁrmation of this regulation within one month of its adoption.
Table 9. CEC Maximum Permissible Levels (Bq/kg) (MPL) for radionuclides in
foodstuﬀs for future accidents.
Radionuclides Baby foods Dairy products Other products Liquid food
Cesium 400 1,000 1,250 1,000
Iodine 150 500 2,000 500
Strontium 75 125 750 125
Plutonium 1 20 80 20
8.2 Intervention Levels for relocation
At present, a subgroup within the Article 31 Group of Experts is preparing a guide
for setting Intervention Levels for relocation. Relocation was not addressed in the
former CEC-criteria for intervention [11]. Publication of the guidelines is planned
for in 1993. The inﬂuence of factors other than dose reduction and monetary costs
will be addressed in this publication.
When only averted doses and monetary costs of relocation are included in the
generic optimisation the ILs for relocation shown in Table 10 will appear.
Table 10. CEC Intervention Levels (ILs) for relocation.
Protective measure Intervention Level
Temporary relocation 10 mSv/month
Permanent relocation 1 Sv
9 Nordic Countries
9.1 Response to the Chernobyl accident
The ﬁve Nordic countries represent together the whole spectrum of fall-out contam-
ination densities in the European countries, from the lowest to the highest contam-
ination levels outside the former USSR. The recommended Intervention Levels for
foodstuﬀ restrictions were also diﬀerent as summarised below.
9.1.1 Denmark
Before the Chernobyl accident no Intervention Levels for foodstuﬀs existed in Den-
mark. In the weeks and months after the accident several activity limits for diﬀerent
foodstuﬀs were set by the authorities. All these levels were derived from dose limits
and were accordingly presented as limits.
For 131I the dose limit was set for a one-year-old child at 50 mSv/a to the
thyroid, and the corresponding activity limits in milk and leafy vegetables were set
at 500 Bq/ and 1000 Bq/kg, respectively.
For the exposure from intakes of activities of the radioisotopes 137Cs and 134Cs
the dose limit was set at 0.5 mSv/a. Assuming a 134Cs/137Cs activity ratio of 1:2
in foodstuﬀs, the corresponding activity limit was set at 500 Bq/kg. This value was
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used until the end of May 1986, where the CEC activity limits for 137Cs content of
370 Bq/kg for baby food and 600 Bq/kg for all other foodstuﬀs were introduced.
9.1.2 Finland
In the beginning of May 1986 the authorities decided to use the recommendations
in the ICRP Publication 40 with regard to restricting the use of foodstuﬀs. A dose
limit of eﬀective dose to the critical group of 5 mSv for the ﬁrst year after the
accident was set. In addition, a dose limit of 50 mSv to single organs was set.
For 131I, small children were considered to be the critical group, and the corre-
sponding activity limit for milk and drinking water was set at 2000 Bq/.
For 137Cs the activity limits were based on the dose limit of 5 mSv, and the
corresponding activity limits were set at 1000 Bq/ for milk and 1000 Bq/kg for
meat.
9.1.3 Iceland
The fall-out levels in Iceland were all less than 100 Bq/m2, and no activity limits
for foodstuﬀs were set.
9.1.4 Norway
Dose limits for the exposure from intake of foodstuﬀs were set at 5 mSv/a as the
eﬀective dose for the ﬁrst year after the Chernobyl accident and 1 mSv/a for the
following years.
The activity limits were named ‘intervention limits’. The limits for the sum of
activities of the radionuclides 134Cs and 137Cs were set at 370 Bq/kg for milk and
baby food, 600 Bq/kg for other foodstuﬀs and 6000 Bq/kg for reindeer, game
and freshwater ﬁsh. For 131I the limit was set at 1000 Bq/kg for all foodstuﬀs.
9.1.5 Sweden
Since 1962 there had been established limits for activity content in imported food-
stuﬀs. These limits were 2000 Bq/kg for 131I and 300 Bq/kg for 137Cs. After the
Chernobyl accident the Swedish authorities set a dose limit of 5 mSv/a for the
ﬁrst year after the accident and 1 mSv/a for the following years for the exposure
from intake of foodstuﬀs.
The activity limit for 137Cs was set at 300 Bq/kg for the most common food-
stuﬀs. For foodstuﬀs which are consumed only in a limited amount, such as wild
berries, mushrooms, reindeer and freshwater ﬁsh, the limit was set at 1500 Bq/kg.
9.2 Common Nordic Levels for foodstuﬀ restrictions
Under the auspices of the Nordic Council of Ministers the food control and ra-
diation protection authorities have jointly developed so-called Common Nordic
Established Intervention Levels (CNEIL) and Common Nordic Tempo-
rary Emergency Levels (CNTEL) for radionuclides in foodstuﬀs [16].
The CNEILs and the CNTELs are equal to the Codex values [10] and ten times
the Codex values, respectively. These values correspond to dose limits of 1 mSv/a
and 5 mSv/a, respectively. The CNTELs should be introduced automatically in
the event of an accident and should be applied for only 30 days. Due to special
circumstances of national character, the authorities in the Nordic countries can set
activity limits between the CNEILs and the CNTELs.
If the Codex values were changed in the future, it is recommended that the
CNEILs and the CNTELs be changed accordingly.
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9.3 Evaluation of the Nordic Intervention Levels
Before a programme of intervention is initiated, the ICRP [6] recommends that it
should be demonstrated, that the proposed intervention will be justiﬁed, i.e. do
more good than harm, and furthermore that the form, scale, and duration of the
intervention have been chosen so as to optimise the protection. The Commission
recommends against the use of dose limits for deciding on the need for, or scope of,
intervention. More precisely, the ICRP states that [6]:
The dose limits recommended by the Commission are intended for use
in the control of practices. The use of these dose limits or of any other
predetermined dose limits as the basis for deciding on intervention
might involve measures that would be out of all proportion to the beneﬁt
obtained and would then conﬂict with the principle of justiﬁcation.
The ICRP recommends that the generically justiﬁed intervention level of averted
dose for any single food would be 10 mSv. The IAEA recommends that the
indicative optimised Intervention Level of averted dose for each of seven main
food categories is ‘about one to a few tens of mSv’.
The Nordic values for activity limits for foodstuﬀs have been based on dose lim-
its. They have not emerged from a justiﬁcation/optimisation process. In addition,
they are used for the whole food basket, whereas both the ICRP and the IAEA
recommend that optimisation be performed for a number of food categories.
An optimisation will not start from a dose level to derive activity levels for inter-
vention, but rather the other way around. For each food category, the optimisation
will give an Intervention Level directly and expressed in Bq/kg. The implied dose
from a normal consumption of each food category can hereafter be compared with
the Intervention Level of averted dose (see Appendix C).
As an example, the annual consumption of beef with a 137Cs content of 30,000
Bq/kg determined from a generic optimisation (see Appendix C) would result in an
annual committed eﬀective dose of about 5 mSv. It will be in accordance with the
recommendations from both the ICRP and the IAEA if the IL for restricting the con-
sumption of beef is set at 30,000 Bq/kg (restrictions above 30,000 Bq/kg, no restric-
tions below 30,000 Bq/kg), because the averted collective dose (> 5 man·mSv/kg)
in monetary terms would exceed the cost of restricting the use of beef.
9.4 Generically optimised Nordic Intervention Levels
For Nordic conditions, generically optimised ILs for foodstuﬀ restrictions, i.e. re-
moval of foodstuﬀs from human consumption, and relocation have been derived with
monetary costs and averted dose as the only parameters entering the optimisation.
The monetary value of the unit collective dose has been assigned a value of 20,000
ECU·manSv−1. The costs of the diﬀerent foodstuﬀ categories and of relocation
are based on Danish economic conditions. These cost levels are, however, believed
to be similar for the other Nordic countries, but this has to be veriﬁed in due course.
Foodstuﬀ restrictions
For foodstuﬀ restrictions, the food basket is divided into three main food categories:
• Milk, cheese, grain products and vegetables
• Pork, ﬁsh, poultry and eggs
• Beef and game
The division into three main groups is related to the price levels of the diﬀerent
foodstuﬀs, i.e. it is assumed that the price level is approximately the same within
each main group. For the calculations made in this report the price levels for each
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of the three groups are 1 ECU/kg, 3 ECU/kg and 6 ECU/kg, respectively. The re-
sults of the optimisation are shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Calculated generically optimised ILs for cesium and iodine isotopes in 3
broad food categories.
Foodstuﬀ IL (Bq/kg)
Milk, cheese, grain products, vegetables 5,000
Pork, ﬁsh, poultry, eggs 15,000
Beef, game 30,000
The generic ILs in Table 11 for the speciﬁc food categories and the radionuclide
group of cesium, iodine, ruthenium, etc. should be compared to the sum of the
activities of these nuclides on the food category.
Due to higher dose factors per unit intake, the ILs for foodstuﬀ restrictions
would, for 90Sr and α-emitters like 239Pu and 241Am, be a factor of 10 and 100
lower than the values in Table 11, respectively.
Relocation
The cost of relocation used to derive an optimised Intervention Level for relocation
can cautiously be set at 200 ECU·month−1·person−1 for Danish economic condi-
tions. This value together with a value of the unit collective dose of 20,000 ECU·Sv−1
will result in an optimised Intervention Level of:
ILrel = 10 mSv·month−1
If the dose accumulated per unit time in a contaminated area exceeds 10 mSv/month
for normal living conditions, relocation should be introduced. Return to the area
could accordingly take place when decay and weathering have reduced the dose level
below the Intervention Level.
10 Summary and conclusions
Radiation protection criteria for dose reduction and intervention levels for protective
measures following an accident have been developed by the international organisa-
tions for more than a decade. This process has been, and to some extent still is, very
confusing because of the mix up with the system of radiological protection for prac-
tices. Dose levels for introducing countermeasures have been interpreted as doses
received and not as doses averted; this might be interpreted as these levels were
dose limits. The most striking and tragic example is the situation prevailing in the
former Soviet Union after the Chernobyl accident.
In the early eighties the international organisations published guidance on Emer-
gency Reference Levels for early countermeasures in the form of broad ranges of
projected doses. For each countermeasure, lower and upper levels of dose were de-
ﬁned as references for the introduction of countermeasures. At dose levels below the
lower level, no action was recommended. Above the upper level, action was almost
certain to be recommended. This two-tier system of dose levels included doses
equal to or a multiple of the dose limits recommended by the ICRP for practices.
The recommendations did not include dose levels for the long-term countermea-
sures.
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The recent development of intervention principles by the IAEA, ICRP and NEA
are based on the justiﬁcation and optimisation principles, namely that each coun-
termeasure should be justiﬁed, i.e. do more good than harm, and the level of the
protective measure should be optimised, i.e. do the most good. Each countermea-
sure should be optimised separately, independent of all other countermeasures.
The Nordic Intervention Levels for foodstuﬀ restrictions have been based on dose
limits, both for the Chernobyl accident and for future accidents. This is not in
line with international recommendations from the ICRP and the IAEA because
predetermined dose limits conﬂict with the principle of justiﬁcation of intervention.
If Nordic Intervention Levels for foodstuﬀ restrictions are based on the optimisa-
tion principle, with averted dose and monetary costs as the only parameters con-
sidered, the generically optimised ILs would be in the range of 5,000−30,000 Bq/kg
for radionuclides with a low dose factor as 131I and 137Cs. For relocation, the gener-
ically optimised IL would be about 10 mSv/month. The assumption behind these
ﬁgures is a monetary value of the unit collective dose of 20,000 ECU·manSv−1.
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A Monetary value of the unit collective
dose
In practice, it is not possible to avoid decisions involving a monetary value of the
improvement of health risks in accident situations where remedial actions can re-
duce the risks imposed on a population or group of people. The decisions on risk
improvement from resource-demanding measures should be made on the basis of
optimising the resources, i.e. the largest improvement gained for a ﬁxed amount
of resources. Cost-beneﬁt analysis, which is a well-established method in economic
theory, has been shown to be a useful tool for decision making, although other and
more extended methods exist.
There are no principal problems in the use of cost-beneﬁt analysis as input to
the decision making process, even if the improvement of the health risk is measured
in monetary units. Several methods exist for the valuation of health risk reduction
expressed in monetary terms. Two of these are brieﬂy summarised here, namely the
Gross National Product Method and the Statistical Life Value Method.
A.1 Gross National Product Method (Human Capital Ap-
proach)
The risk of radiation-induced fatal cancer, R, has recently been updated by the
UNSCEAR. The value of the risk factor R for low radiation doses given at low
dose rates is 0.05 Sv−1. The loss of life expectancy, E, for a radiation-induced fatal
cancer can be set at 15 years as an average value estimated from the relative and
absolute risk models. The Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in Denmark
is 25,000 ECU·a−1 in 1991 prices.
The monetary value of the unit dose, α, can be calculated from these parameters
with the assumption that a society is willing to pay, as a maximum, the value of
the GNP per capita to avoid one year of lost life expectancy.
The monetary value of α can accordingly be expressed as:
α = R ·E ·GNP (A.1)
= 0.05 cancer · Sv−1 · 15 a · cancer−1 · 25, 000 ECU · a−1
= 20, 000 ECU · Sv−1
The radiation protection authorities in the Nordic countries have recommended an
α-value of 20,000 US$·Sv−1 before the change of the risk factor by UNSCEAR. After
the revision of the radiation risk factors the Nordic radiation protection authorities
have recommended an α-value of up to 100,000 US$ per man Sievert.
A.2 Statistical Life Value Method
From the so-called retrospective studies of the amount of money actually spent to
save a human life, the value of a statistical life can be deduced. The literature
on the subject is fairly large. A Danish study [15] evaluated some of this literature
and the results of 9 independent studies on the value of a statistical life have been
plotted on log-normal probability paper. These are shown in Figure A.1 below.
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Figure 1. Diﬀerent valuations of the price of a statistical human life.
The nine diﬀerent values shown in the ﬁgure are based on the following sources:
(1) The amount of money spent by the British agricultural industry to avoid a
fatal accident during ﬁeld work
(2) Estimate from the British Road Laboratory
(3) The valuation of the authors [15]
(4) The valuation of the Danish Road Directorate in 1978
(5) The actual amount of money spent in the UK to avoid fatal traﬃc accidents
(6) The amount spent by the steel industry in the UK to avoid fatal accidents
(7) The result of an inquiry among health physicists
(8) The amount of money spent by the medical industry in the UK to avoid fatal
accidents
(9) The valuation on the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) on the money
spent on nuclear safety at the nuclear power plants in the US
The median value shown in the ﬁgure of about 200,000 ECU is close to the amount
of money spent on traﬃc safety both in the UK and in Denmark. Correcting this
ﬁgure for inﬂation gives a value of a statistical life in the order of 300,000 ECU
in 1991 prices. If this value is used as an indicative average amount of money a
western society is willing to pay for saving a statistical life, SL, the monetary value
of α can be calculated to be:
α = R · SL = 0, 05 life · Sv−1 · 300, 000 ECU · life−1 = 15, 000 ECU · Sv−1 (A.2)
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B Principles for establishing Intervention
Levels
The control of exposures following an accident can be achieved only by some form
of intervention aimed at modifying the environment or restricting people’s freedom
of action or choice. Such intervention will impose some costs on society and may
cause direct harm and disruption of life to some people. Consequently, it should not
be taken lightly.
The purpose of intervention is to put potentially exposed individuals into a better
position in the sense that lower overall risks are achieved at a reasonable cost in
ﬁnancial and social terms. While this objective is both clear and conceptually simple,
the practical determination of what constitutes the most appropriate type and level
of intervention in any particular circumstances is more complex. Because of the
potential importance of political and social factors, there is, inevitably, much scope
for diﬀering outcomes; such diﬀerences should not be unexpected or surprising.
However, these issues need to be addressed explicitly to achieve the objectives of
the intervention.
Various decision-aiding techniques are available to assist judgements in such com-
plex areas. None has, however, such compelling advantages as to recommend its
universal application and much would depend on the problem being investigated.
Cost-beneﬁt analysis is one of the simpler and more readily understood tech-
niques and, for this reason alone, has been used in [4] to illustrate a number of the
more important issues in making decisions on intervention.
The problem of deciding on intervention levels can be conceptualized in simple
cost-beneﬁt terms, where the net beneﬁt B is expressed as:
B = (Y0 − YI) + Bc −X −R−A (B.1)
where:
B is the net beneﬁt achieved by the protective measure,
Y0 is the cost equivalent of the radiation detriment if the protective measure is
not taken,
YI is the cost equivalent of the remaining radiation detriment if the protective
measure is carried out,
Bc is the cost equivalent of the reassurance beneﬁt from the protective measure
X is the monetary cost of implementing the protective measure,
R is the cost equivalent of the risk introduced by the protective measure itself,
A is the cost equivalent of the anxiety and disruption caused by the protective
measure.
It is evident from Equation (B.1) that intervention would be justiﬁed whenever
the value of B was positive and that the optimum would be achieved when B
was a maximum provided that the terms are deﬁned broadly enough to encompass
all the radiological protection factors. The sole constraint in this process is that
intervention should be introduced at a level of individual dose below those at which
serious deterministic health eﬀects occur (see principle (3) of the IAEA guidance
[4]); the sole exception to this generalization is the case in which such intervention
would, in practice, worsen the situation.
In practice it is diﬃcult to quantify, in monetary cost, all the terms of the equa-
tion, and subjective value judgements, similar to those in most social and economic
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decisions, would often need to be made. Equation (B.1), however, provides a con-
ceptual framework for such judgements. Despite the broad international accord on
the principles and objectives of intervention, diﬀerences are to be expected in their
practical expression. These will result from diﬀerences in the weighting of the vari-
ous terms in Eq. (B.1). The most important source of diﬀerence however, will, result
from the weight given to factors of a non-radiological, socio-political, and enevitably
less tangible nature. For example, there may be pressure by the public to introduce
intervention in response to a perceived risk, even where the actual level of risk and
the cost averting it would not, in itself, justify the intervention. Similarly, there
may be pressure to maintain doses beneath existing dose limits or some other pre-
scribed limits developed for a totally diﬀerent purpose, despite its being wrong and
possibly counterproductive.
Assuming that the cost terms Bc, R and A in Equation (B.1) are independent
of the intervention level I, and that only the costs X and Y depend on I, then the
maximum net beneﬁt B occurs when:
dX(I)
dI
+
dY (I)
dI
= 0 (B.2)
The cost equivalent of the remaining detriment if the protective measure is carried
out, Y (I), is given by:
Y (I) = α · S(I) (B.3)
where α is the monetary value assigned to the unit collective dose. This parameter
is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.
In the following, Equation (B.2) is further elaborated for the countermeasures
relocation/return and foodstuﬀ restriction. Illustrative numerical examples
on intervention level settings for these two countermeasures are shown in Appendix
B.
Relocation/Return
If relocation is applied to a group of people, N , who would each have experienced the
same dose accumulated per unit time, E˙(t), for a time τ , during which individual
doses now are zero, the cost terms in Eq. (B.1) can be rewritten as functions of
relocation time τ :
Y0 = α ·N ·
∫ ∞
0
E˙(t) · dt (B.4)
YI(τ) = α ·N ·
∫ ∞
τ
E˙(t) · dt (B.5)
ΔY (τ) = Y0 − YI(τ) = α ·N ·
∫ τ
0
E˙(t) · dt (B.6)
X(τ) = N · (X0 + a · τ) (B.7)
where
a is the cost per unit time of relocation, e.g. cost for food and accommodation
in the area of relocation,
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X0 is a ﬁxed cost representing the transportation cost of a person and his
belongings to and from the new location.
Relocation is then justiﬁed only if B(τ) in Equation (B.1) is positive at any given
time τ . The optimum intervention level expressed as a dose avertable per unit
time (which is diﬀerent from an instantaneous dose rate) can be found by substi-
tuting the cost terms from Eqs. (B.4) - (B.7) into Eq. (B.1):
dB(τ)
dτ
=
dΔY (τ)
dτ
− dX(τ)
dτ
(B.8)
= α ·N · E˙(τ)−N · a = 0
which leads to:
E˙opt =
a
α
(B.9)
It should be emphasized that the ratio a/α, and thus the optimum dose avertable
per unit time by relocation (and its termination), will, in general, be much less
sensitive to geographical location than either a or α alone, because both quantities
are likely to be similarly correlated to national wealth.
Foodstuﬀ restrictions
The rate at which the average individual eﬀective dose is committed, E˙, from the
consumption of contaminated foodstuﬀs is proportional to the consumption rate,
V , and the concentration of radionuclides in the food, C(t):
E˙(t) = C(t) · V · e(50) (B.10)
where e(50) is the committed eﬀective dose per unit intake by ingestion of contam-
inated foodstuﬀs.
The cost per unit mass of a given foodstuﬀ, b, and the consumption rate, V , of
that foodstuﬀ will give the cost of consumption of the foodstuﬀ per unit time, a,
as:
a = b · V (B.11)
which can be taken to be the cost of restricting the foodstuﬀ per unit time. The
cost of restricting foodstuﬀs over a time period, t, is therefore:
X(t) = a · t = b · V · t (B.12)
The beneﬁt of the avertable dose from the restriction of the foodstuﬀ over a time
period, τ , is given as:
ΔY (τ) =
∫ τ
0
E˙(t)dt (B.13)
and the net beneﬁt, B(τ), of the restriction is:
B(τ) = ΔY (τ) −X(τ) (B.14)
The optimum Intervention Level can be found from:
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dB(τ)
dτ
=
dΔY (τ)
dτ
− dX(τ)
dτ
(B.15)
= α · E˙(τ) − b · V
= α · C(τ) · V · e(50)− b · V = 0
which leads to the optimum value of the Intervention Level of avertable activity
concentration:
Copt =
b
α · e(50) (B.16)
The optimum intervention concentration, Copt, depends on the ratio b/α which will
be less sensitive to geographical location than either b or α alone.
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C Intervention Levels for late counter-
measures
C.1 Relocation/return
The purpose of relocation is to prevent further exposure from radionuclides de-
posited on buildings and ground surfaces. The exposure pathways are external irra-
diation and inhalation of resuspended activity. These exposures have to be evaluated
from measurements of the radiation ﬁelds and activity distribution and composition
in the environment.
The cost of relocating an individual can be expressed as:
Xrel(t) = X0 + a · t (C.1)
where X0 is a ﬁxed cost representing the transportation cost of a person and his
belongings to the new location and a cost rate, a, representing the cost for food and
accommodation and other cost rates such as lost income rate and deterioration rate
of property.
The dose averted by relocation for a time τ , E(τ), is equivalent to an averted
radiation detriment. The value of this detriment can be expressed as (see Section
2.2):
ΔY (τ) = α · E(τ) (C.2)
where α is the monetary value assigned to the unit dose (see Appendix I). Relocation
is justiﬁed if, at any time τ , the relocation cost per unit time is less than the cost
of the radiation detriment averted per unit time.
The Intervention Level (IL) for introducing relocation (and its withdrawal)
expressed as an optimum rate of dose averted per unit time, E˙opt, is, according to
Section 2.2:
ILrel = E˙opt =
a
α
(C.3)
The average cost rate for relocation in the Nordic countries can be set at 200 −
500 ECU/month per person. Using a value range of α of 20,000 − 50,000 ECU/Sv,
relocation should be introduced in areas where the actual rate of dose accumulation
will exceed:
ILrel =
200− 500 ECU ·month−1
20, 000− 50, 000 ECU · Sv−1 = 4− 25 mSv/month (C.4)
≈ 10 mSv/month
If the time-averaged shielding factor for the given area is 0.2, the Operational
Intervention Level (OIL) for relocation expressed as a free-air external dose
rate will be:
OILrel =
(4− 25)/0.2
24 · 30 = 30− 180 μSv/h (C.5)
Therefore, in areas where the measured outdoor dose rate exceeds 30 − 180 μSv/h,
relocation should be implemented. When the outdoor dose rate due to decay and
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weathering drops below 30 − 180 μSv/h, people can return to the area. If there is
a signiﬁcant inhalation exposure pathway from resuspended materiel, the averted
dose should be calculated (projected) as the sum of the external and the commit-
ted eﬀective inhalation dose and compared to the Intervention Level of 4 − 25
mSv/month.
C.2 Foodstuﬀ restriction
The purpose of imposing food restrictions is to prevent or reduce ingestion doses
from contaminated foodstuﬀs. The costs of the remedial measures include the value
of the lost produce and the costs of disposal and the institutional framework that
will need to be set up and operated to eﬀect the control.
According to Section 2.2 the Intervention Level for a given foodstuﬀ ex-
pressed as the concentration of a given radionuclide will depend only on the cost
of the foodstuﬀ, b, and the value of the unit dose, α:
IL = Copt =
b
α · e(50) (C.6)
In the following, calculations will be made for foodstuﬀs in a Danish “food basket”.
The total costs of the remedial measures will here be set equal to the consumer
prices. The Danish “food basket” of approximately 500 kg/a per person is shown
in Table C.1. The foodstuﬀs are categorised in seven price categories.
Table C.1. Food consumption rate and approximate cost levels.
Foodstuﬀ Consumption (kg/a) Cost (ECU/kg)
Milk + cheese 173 1
Rye 29
Wheat Grain products 44 0.5
Oats 7
Potatoes 73
Cabbage 33
Carrots Vegetables 11 1
Apples, fruit 51
Beef 18 6
Pork 37 3
Fish 11 4
Eggs 11 2
The optimised IL (Copt) has been calculated for each of the 7 food categories for
nuclides with a representative value of the dose factor e(50) (dose per unit activi-
ty intake) of 10−8 Sv/Bq (Cs- and I-isotopes) and an α-value of 20,000 ECU/Sv.
The eﬀective doses committed in a year from the annual consumption shown in
32 Risø–R–652(EN)
Table C.1 has been calculated with the condition that all the foodstuﬀs are con-
taminated for the whole year to a level equal to the IL, in contrast to the CEC
recommendations which assume that only 10% was contaminated for the whole
year. The results are shown in Table C.2.
Table C.2. Calculated ILs foodstuﬀ restriction for cesium and iodine isotopes in a
Danish “food basket” and the resulting committed eﬀective doses.
Foodstuﬀ Consumption (kg/a) IL (Bq/kg) E (mSv/a)
Milk + cheese 173 5,000 8.7
Grain Products 80 2,500 2.0
Vegetables 168 5,000 8.4
Beef 18 30,000 5.4
Pork 37 15,000 5.6
Fish 11 20,000 2.2
Eggs 11 10,000 1.1
Sum 498 33.4
Intervention Levels for foodstuﬀs established in this way, i.e. irrespective of the con-
tamination of other foodstuﬀs and other exposure pathways, will make it necessary
to ensure that the overall levels of doses do not approach the levels where deter-
ministic eﬀects might occur. In the above example, the optimum annual committed
dose from ingestion of cesium or iodine isotopes is 33 mSv.
The corresponding ILs for 90Sr and 239Pu will be a factor 10 and 100 lower,
respectively, due to higher dose factors.
If only 10% of the foodstuﬀs are contaminated up to the level of the ILs for the
whole year, the annual committed eﬀective dose will be a factor of 10 lower.
If the “food basket” is divided into 3 broad categories, the following values of
the IL for Cs- and I-isotopes can be calculated for a Danish (Nordic) “food basket”
to the values shown in Table C.3.
Table C.3. Calculated ILs for cesium and iodine isotopes in 3 broad food categories.
Foodstuﬀ IL (Bq/kg)
Milk, cheese, grain products, vegetables 5,000
Pork, ﬁsh, poultry, eggs 15,000
Beef, game 30,000
The annual committed eﬀective doses from consumption of foodstuﬀs contaminated
with 137Cs up to these ILs for a whole year will be 33 mSv, distributed with 20
mSv, 10 mSv, and 3 mSv on the categories milk, pork and beef, respectively.
The annual cost of the total “food basket” is according to Table C.1 equal to 666
ECU·a−1 giving an implicit α-value of 666/33 = 20 ECU·mSv−1 (Q.E.D.).
The ICRP recommends that the Intervention Level for restricting a single food-
stuﬀ is almost always justiﬁed at an eﬀective dose committed in a year of 10 mSv.
The IAEA recommends that the Intervention Levels for restricting foodstuﬀs should
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be in the range of one to a few tens of mSv separately for each of seven food
categories: dairy products, meats, vegetables, grain, fruit, drinking water, and bev-
erages. The intervention levels in Tables C.2 and C.3 are therefore in good agreement
with both the ICRP and the IAEA recommendations.
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